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Abstract
Private information retrieval systems (PIRs) allow a user to extract an item from a database
that is replicated over k ≥ 1 servers, while satisfying various privacy constraints. We exhibit
quantum k-server symmetrically-private information retrieval systems (QSPIRs) that use sub-
linear communication, do not use shared randomness among the servers, and preserve privacy
against honest users and dishonest servers. Classically, SPIRs without shared randomness do
not exist at all.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Setting
The Private Information Retrieval problem was introduced by Chor et al. [4]. A user wants to learn
a bit xi from an n-bit database x = x1 . . . xn, for some i ∈ [n] of his choice. The privacy of the user
requires that the database server learns nothing about i, in the information-theoretic sense, and
general efficiency considerations require the communication between the user and the database to be
limited. Clearly, PIR can be realized by making the server send the whole database to the user. This
takes n bits of communication and can be shown to be optimal. Better protocols exist if the database
is replicated among some k ≥ 2 different servers, who cannot communicate [4, 1, 2]. Here we require
that individual servers learn nothing about i. For k = 2, the best known scheme uses O(n1/3) bits
of communication [4], and asymptotically the best known k-server uses nO(log log(k)/k log(k)) bits [2].
For k ≥ 2, no good lower bounds on the required communication are known for this setting.
In a recent paper, we showed how to obtain quantum PIR systems (QPIR, where the parties are
quantum computers and the communication consists of qubits) that use slightly less communication
than the best known classical schemes [8]. In Table 1 we list the best known bounds on the
communication complexity for small numbers of servers, in the classical as well as quantum case.
In its standard form, PIR just protects the privacy of the user : the individual servers learn
nothing about i. But now suppose we also want to protect the privacy of the data. That is, we don’t
want the user to learn anything about x beyond the xi that he asks for. For example, because the
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Servers PIR complexity QPIR complexity
k = 1 Θ(n) Θ(n)
k = 2 O(n1/3) O(n3/10)
k = 3 O(n1/5.25) O(n1/7)
k = 4 O(n1/7.87) O(n1/11)
Table 1: Best known bounds on the communication complexity of classical and quantum PIR
user should pay a fee for every xi that he learns (pay-per-view), or because the database contains
very sensitive information. This setting of Symmetrically-Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)
was introduced by Gertner et al. [6]. They showed that SPIR is impossible even if the user is
honest (i.e., follows the protocol) and the servers can individually flip coins [6, Appendix A]. This
no-go result holds no matter how many servers and how many bits and rounds of communication
we allow. Therefore they extended the PIR model by allowing the servers to share a random string
that is hidden from the user, and showed how to turn any PIR scheme into a SPIR scheme with
shared randomness among the servers, at a small extra communication cost. The resulting schemes
are information-theoretically secure even against dishonest users, and use a number of random bits
that is of the same order as the communication.
The necessity of shared randomness for classical SPIR schemes is a significant drawback, since
information-theoretic security requires new shared randomness for each application of the scheme.
This either requires a lot of extra communication between the servers (if new shared randomness
is generated for each new application) or much memory on the parts of the servers (if randomness
is generated once for many applications, each server needs to store this).
1.2 Results
In this paper, we study the existence and efficiency of SPIR schemes in the quantum world, where
user and servers have quantum computers and can communicate qubits. Here user privacy means
that the states of individual servers should all be independent of i, and data privacy means that
the concatenation of the various states of the user is independent of the bits xj for all j 6= i. We
can distinguish between honest-user and dishonest-user data privacy. In the first case, data privacy
holds if the user is honest (follows the protocol). In the second case, data privacy should hold even
if the user deviates from the protocol in any way.
Our main result is that honest-user quantum SPIR schemes exist even in the case where the
servers do not share any randomness. As mentioned above, such honest-user SPIRs without shared
randomness are impossible in the classical world. This gives another example of a cryptographic
task that can be performed with information-theoretic security in the quantum world but that
is impossible classically (key distribution [3] is the main example of this). The communication
complexity of our k-server QSPIR schemes is of the same order as that of the best known classical
k-server PIR schemes. At first sight, one might think this trivial: just take a classical scheme,
ensure data privacy using shared randomness among the servers, and then get rid of the shared
randomness by letting the user entangle the messages to the servers. However, this would violate
data privacy, as the user would now have “access” to the servers’ shared randomness. In actuality
we do something quite different, making use of the fact that the servers can add phases that multiply
out to an overall phase. This phase allows the user to extract xi, but nothing else. For k = 2 we
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also give an alternative, less efficient scheme based on the properties of Bell states.
The notion of an honest user is somewhat delicate, because clearly users cannot be trusted to
follow the protocol in all cases. Still, there are scenarios where the assumption of a honest user is
not unreasonable, for example in pay-per-view systems where the user accesses the system via some
box (attached to his TV) that is sealed or otherwise protected from tampering. In this case the
user cannot deviate from the protocol, but he can still be curious, trying to observe what goes on
inside of his box to try to extract more information about the database. Our honest-user QSPIRs
are perfectly secure against such users.
It would be nice to have SPIR schemes that are secure even against dishonest users. However,
we exhibit a large class of PIR schemes (quantum as well as classical) that can all be cheated by a
dishonest quantum user. Our honest-user QSPIRs fall in this class and hence are not secure against
dishonest users. Fortunately, if we are willing to allow shared randomness between the servers then
the best classical SPIRs can easily be made secure against even dishonest quantum users: if the
servers measure the communication in the computational basis, the scheme is equivalent to the
classical scheme, even if the user is quantum.
Remarks:
(1) Often the PIR setting is generalized to t-secure PIR, where no colluding set of t servers
together have any information about i. We focus on the t = 1 case here in order to simplify the
presentation.
(2) Very efficient PIR and SPIR schemes are possible under computational assumptions, even
for k = 1 servers (see e.g. the references at [7]). In this paper we focus on information-theoretic
security.
2 Definitions
We assume familiarity with the quantum model [9]. The various variants of PIR are defined below.
Definition 1 A one-round, k-server private information retrieval (PIR) scheme with recovery
probability 1/2 + ε, query size t, and answer size a, consists of a randomized algorithm (the user),
and k randomized algorithms S1, . . . , Sk (the servers), such that
1. On input i ∈ [n], the user produces k t-bit queries q1, . . . , qk and sends these to the respective
servers. The jth server sends back an a-bit string aj . The user outputs a bit b depending on
i, a1, . . . , ak, and his randomness.
2. Recovery: For all x and i, the probability (over the user’s and servers’ randomness) that
b = xi is at least 1/2 + ε.
3. User privacy: For all j, the distribution of qj (over the user’s randomness) is independent
of i.
The communication complexity of the scheme is the total length of the communication between the
user and the servers, i.e. k(t+ a) bits.
All best known PIR schemes satisfy the above definitions with ε = 1/2 (i.e., no error probability),
and we will hereafter take ε = 1/2 unless mentioned otherwise. It is open whether multiple-round
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schemes can be better than the one-round variety we defined here. For PIR schemes, we can assume
without loss of generality that the servers are deterministic. However, we need randomized servers
for the symmetrically-private variety:
Definition 2 A symmetrically-private information retrieval (SPIR) scheme is a PIR scheme with
the additional property of data privacy: the user’s “view” (i.e. the concatenation of his various
states during the protocol) does not depend on xj, for all j 6= i. We distinguish between private-
randomness and shared-randomness SPIR schemes, depending on whether the servers individually
flip coins or have a shared random coin (hidden from the user). We also distinguish between honest-
user and dishonest-user SPIR, depending on whether data privacy should hold even when the user
deviates from the protocol.
Definition 3 We define quantum versions QPIR and QSPIR of PIR and SPIR, respectively, in
the obvious way: the user and the servers are quantum computers, and the communication uses
quantum bits; user privacy means that the density matrix of each server is independent of i at all
points in the protocol; data privacy means that the concatenation of the density matrices that the
user has at the various points of the protocol, is independent of xj , for all j 6= i. For QSPIR, we
still have the distinctions of private/public-randomness and honest/dishonest-user.
As mentioned in the introduction, Gertner et al. [6, Appendix A] exhibited quite efficient
shared-randomness SPIR schemes. One might think that these can be turned into SPIR schemes
with deterministic servers as follows: the user picks a random string, sends it to each of the
servers (along with the queries) to establish shared randomness between them, and then erases (or
“forgets”) his copy of the random string. However, this erasing of the random string by the user
is ruled out by the definition, since the user’s view includes the random string he drew. In fact,
Gertner et al. [6, Appendix A] showed that shared randomness between the servers is necessary for
the existence of classical SPIR (even for multi-round protocols):
Fact 1 For every k ≥ 1, there is no k-server private-randomness SPIR scheme.
Intuitively, the reason is that since the servers have no knowledge of i (by user privacy), their
individual messages need to be independent of all bits of x, including xi, to ensure data privacy.
But since they cannot coordinate via shared randomness, their joint messages will be independent
of the whole x as well, so the user cannot learn xi.
Below we show that this negative result does not apply to the quantum world: using coordination
via quantum entanglement, we can get honest-user QSPIRs without any communication or shared
randomness between the servers at any stage of the protocol.
3 Honest-user quantum SPIR schemes
3.1 Honest-user QSPIRs from PIRs
Our honest-user QSPIR schemes work on top of the PIR schemes recently developed by Beimel et
al. [2]. These, as well as all others known, work as follows: the user picks a random string r, and
depending on i and r, picks k queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ {0, 1}t. He sends these to the respective servers,
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who respond with answers a1, . . . , ak ∈ {0, 1}a. The user then outputs
k∑
j=1
aj · bj = xi,
where b1, . . . , bk ∈ {0, 1}a are determined by i and r, and everything is modulo 2.
We will now describe the quantum SPIR scheme. As before, the user picks r, q1, . . . , qk. In
addition, he picks k random strings r1, . . . , rk ∈ {0, 1}a. He defines r′j = rj + bj and sets up the
following (k + 1)-register state
1√
2
|0〉|q1, r1〉 · · · |qk, rk〉+ 1√
2
|1〉|q1, r′1〉 · · · |qk, r′k〉.
The user keeps the first 1-qubit register to himself, and sends the other k registers to the respective
servers. The jth server sees a random mixture of |qj, rj〉 and |qj, r′j〉. Since qj gives no information
about i (by the user privacy of the classical PIR scheme) and each of rj and r
′
j is individually
random, the server learns nothing about i. The jth server performs the following unitary mapping
|qj, r〉 → (−1)aj ·r|qj , r〉,
which he can do because aj only depends on qj and x. The servers then send everything back to
the user; the overall communication is 2k(t + a) qubits, double that of the original scheme. The
user now has the state
1√
2
|0〉(−1)a1 ·r1|q1, r1〉 · · · (−1)ak ·rk |qk, rk〉+ 1√
2
|1〉(−1)a1 ·r′1|q1, r′1〉 · · · (−1)ak ·r
′
k |qk, r′k〉.
Up to an insignificant global phase (−1)
∑
j
aj ·rj , this is equal to
1√
2
|0〉|q1, r1〉 · · · |qk, rk〉+ 1√
2
|1〉(−1)
∑k
j=1
aj ·bj |q1, r′1〉 · · · |qk, r′k〉 =
1√
2
|0〉|q1, r1〉 · · · |qk, rk〉+ 1√
2
|1〉(−1)xi |q1, r′1〉 · · · |qk, r′k〉.
The user can learn xi from this by returning everything except the first qubit to 0, and then
applying the Hadamard transform to the first qubit, which maps 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
(−1)xi |1〉 → |xi〉. On
the other hand, he can learn nothing else, since the various states of the user during the protocol
never depend on any other xj. Accordingly, we have an honest-user QSPIR scheme with recovery
probability 1. Note that nowhere in the protocol do the servers have shared randomness: they do
not start with it, the random strings rj , r
′
j are not correlated between servers, and the servers do
not end with any shared randomness (in fact they end with nothing).
Plugging in the best known classical PIR schemes, due to [2], gives
Theorem 1 For every k ≥ 2, there exists a honest-user QSPIR (without shared randomness) with
communication complexity nO(log log(k)/k log(k)).
Slightly better complexities can be obtained for small k, as stated in the first column of Table 1
in the introduction. For k = 1 our scheme communicates 2n qubits (just start from a 1-server
scheme with query length 0, a1 = x and b1 = ei), for k = 2 it uses O(n
1/3) qubits, for k = 3 it uses
O(n1/5.25) qubits etc. Notice that we cannot use the (slightly better) k-server QPIR schemes from
the second column of Table 1, since these reveal more than 1 bit about x.
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3.2 Honest-user 2-server QSPIR with Bell states
The QSPIR scheme of the previous section requires communication O(n1/3) for the case of two
servers. Here we present a different scheme based on the Bell states. The scheme is suboptimal
since it requires linear communication, but it makes use of some interesting properties of the Bell
states and it could be easier to implement in the lab.
Our scheme works for even n = 2m, but for odd n we can just add a dummy bit to x to make
it even. It relies on three of the Bell states:
|B00〉 = |00〉 + |11〉√
2
, |B01〉 = |01〉+ |10〉√
2
, |B10〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√
2
and the four Pauli matrices
σ00 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, σ01 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
σ10 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, σ11 =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
.
We first describe our scheme for n = 2. If the user wants to know x1, he builds the following 3-qubit
state
1√
2
(|0〉|B00〉+ |1〉|B01〉) ,
and if he wants to know x2 he builds
1√
2
(|0〉|B00〉+ |1〉|B10〉) .
He sends the second qubit to server 1 and the third to server 2, keeping the first qubit to himself.
It is easy to see that each server always gets a completely mixed qubit, so the servers learn nothing
about i. Both servers will now apply σx1x2 to the qubit they receive. That is, they will apply a
phase flip if x1 = 1 and a bit flip if x2 = 1. The following properties are easily verified:
(σx ⊗ σx)|B00〉 = |B00〉
(σx ⊗ σx)|B01〉 = (−1)x1 |B01〉
(σx ⊗ σx)|B10〉 = (−1)x2 |B10〉
The servers then send their qubit back to the user. By the above properties, if the user wanted to
know x1, then he now has
1√
2
(|0〉|B00〉+ (−1)x1 |1〉|B01〉) ,
and if he wanted x2 he has
1√
2
(|0〉|B00〉+ (−1)x2 |1〉|B10〉) .
From this the user can extract the bit xi of his choice (with probability 1)—and nothing else. Thus
we have an honest-user 2-server QSPIR for n = 2 with 4 qubits of communication.
To generalize to arbitrary n = 2m, the user can employ a larger state that involves m Bell
states to extract xi. Namely, if i = 2j − 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ m) then he uses
1√
2
(
|0〉|B00〉⊗m + |1〉|B00〉⊗j−1|B01〉|B00〉⊗m−j
)
,
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and if i = 2j then he uses
1√
2
(
|0〉|B00〉⊗m + |1〉|B00〉⊗j−1|B10〉|B00〉⊗m−j
)
.
The user sends the left qubit of each of the Bells states to server 1, the right qubit of each Bell
state to server 2, and keeps the first qubit to himself. The servers then apply σx2j−1x2j to the jth
qubit they receive (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) and send back the result. Using the same properties as
before, it can easily be verified that we just get the appropriate phase-factor (−1)xi in the |1〉-part
of the user’s total state and nothing else. Thus we have a scheme that works for all n and that
simultaneously hides i from the servers and x− xi from an honest user. In total, the scheme uses
2n qubits of communication: m = n/2 to each server, and m = n/2 back.
4 Dishonest-user quantum SPIR schemes
The assumption that the user is honest (i.e., follows the protocol) is somewhat painful, since the
servers cannot rely on this. In particular, a dishonest quantum user can extract about log n bits
of information about x of any honest-user QSPIR where the user’s final state is pure, as follows.
Consider such a pure QSPIR scheme, with as many servers and communication as you like. From
the user’s high level perspective, this can be viewed as a unitary that maps
|i〉|0〉 → |i〉|xi〉|φi,xi〉.
Because of data privacy, the state |φi,xi〉 only depends on i and xi. Therefore by one application
of the QSPIR and some unitary post-processing, the user can erase |φi,xi〉, mapping
|i〉|0〉 → |i〉|xi〉,
for any i or superposition of is of his choice. That is, one run of the QSPIR can be used to make one
query to x. Van Dam [5] has shown how one quantum query to x can be used to obtain Ω(log n)
bits of information about x (in the information-theoretic sense that is, not necessarily log n specific
database-bits xj). Accordingly, any pure QSPIR that is secure against an honest user will leak at
least Ω(log n) bits of information about x to a cheating user. This includes our schemes from the
previous section. Even worse, the servers cannot even detect whether the user cheats, because they
will have the same state in the honest scheme as well as in the cheating scheme.
How to protect against dishonest quantum users? In fact we can just use a classical SPIR that
is secure against dishonest users (of course, this will be a shared-randomness scheme again). If
we require the servers to measure what they receive in the computational basis, then a dishonest
quantum user cannot extract more information than a classical dishonest user—that is, nothing
except one xi.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the best known PIR schemes can be turned into quantum PIR schemes that
are symmetrically private with respect to a honest user, i.e., except for the bit xi that he asks for,
the honest user receives no information whatsoever about the database x. Rather interestingly,
the best known quantum PIR schemes use polynomially less communication than the best known
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classical schemes (Table 1), but our PIR-to-QSPIR reduction does not seem to work starting from
a quantum PIR system. We leave it as an open question whether the communication complexity of
QSPIR schemes can be significantly reduced, either based on the QPIR schemes of [8] or via some
other method.
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